



EVOLVING CAMPUS SECURITY: DESIGNING A SUCCESSFUL PLAN



The Society for College
and University Planning

SCUP 2019 Annual Conference

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Hello!

Greg Cunningham

Chief of Police
Houston Community College

Kimberly Hickson

Principal
Perkins&Will

A hand holding a white coffee cup against a blue background. The hand is positioned on the left side of the frame, with the fingers wrapped around the cup. The background is a solid blue color with a subtle, wavy pattern.

SUMMARY & LEARNING OUTCOMES

Summary

Prioritizing security must be part of the campus's evolution and planning. Effective campus security finds balance between creating an open, free environment and upholding the duty to protect people. The right solution weighs expenditures between personnel, technology, facility design, and crime prevention education to develop a program that is efficient and affordable. Come explore a roadmap to planning your security guidelines and resources for your campus as well as participate in a dialogue about your campus ideas, lessons, and challenges.

Learning Outcomes

- 1. Outline** a security plan process that includes assembling a committee of experts and stakeholders, assessing risk, and determining how campus and building design and infrastructure affect security and safety.
- 2. Describe** why the security operations center (building) is a critical component of a master security plan and what building features are most important to upgrade to improve campus security.
- 3. List** design and implementation strategies for grounds, buildings, facilities, building access control and surveillance, emergency power and communications, mechanical systems, and security systems.
- 4. Discuss** with peers your security plan, what's working on your campus, and how you important the security plan into your campus master plan and the design of new buildings.

AGENDA

- Current Facts
- Planning
- Design + Implementation
- Resources



Current Facts

*“Being powerful is like being a lady,
if you have to tell people you are, you aren’t”*
Margaret Thatcher

CURRENT FACTS

“Being powerful is like being a lady, if you have to tell people you are, you aren’t”

Margaret Thatcher

Reduction

Good news, FBI’s study related to active shooter/killer events has dropped in the school setting and increased in the work setting.

Weapons

A move away from traditional weapons to uncommon tools, knives & vehicles are the most common new comers.

Escape

Escape plans are essential to removing students from danger is the priority.

PREVENTION

“Being powerful is like being a lady, if you have to tell people you are, you aren’t”

Margaret Thatcher

- Recognize behavior change
- Address behavior quickly
- Utilize Behavior Intervention Teams (BIT)
- Take Action
- Well thought out plan to manage the event
- Practice plans
- Conduct drills under real conditions
- Review and readjust

CURRENT FACTS

*“No one has a solution ...
everyone has the solution and we cannot agree to one ...”*

Solutions to response

- Run Hide Fight
- ADD (Avoid , Deny, Defend)
- Alice (Alert, Lockdown, Inform, Counter, Evacuate)

Change Response

Physicians want the Department of Homeland Security slogan, Run-Hide-Fight, replaced by a new strategy for hospitals, which they called, "secure, preserve, fight."



Sandy Hook Elementary School / Svigals + Partners Architects



WHAT IS BEING SAID

"If I had asked people what they wanted, they would have said faster horses."

Attributed to Henry Ford

Solutions are all over the board

- Ohio installing pepper spray system
- School Marshal vs. Guardian
 - “Passing the buck” to teachers
 - Teacher medical training
- Only Police should be armed
- Texas Appleseed – no police on campus
- Arming Teachers makes guns more accessible
- What stops a bad guy? A good guy with a gun?
- Temperament to carry a gun

A photograph showing a man from behind, wearing a dark shirt and a watch, holding a handgun high in the air. He is in a crowd of people, some of whom are also holding up their phones. The background is slightly blurred, suggesting an indoor setting like a school assembly.

Just a thought ...
ARMING SCHOOL STAFF



Planning

"Every time you feel yourself being pulled into other people's drama, repeat these words:

Not my circus, not my monkeys."

Polish Proverb

START UP INFORMATION

Budget

Programs & Spaces

Special Requirements

RESEARCH & PRIORITIZE



- Texas schools are required to have a Threat, Vulnerability, Risk Assessment (TVRA) less than 5 years old. Have you read your TVRA?
- The TVRA will address all:
 - Natural hazards based on location
 - Man-made hazards
 - Shooter | Killer prevention
- If they don't have one, request one for them ... as without it you cannot plan

RISK ASSESMENT – CAP INDEX



**Brazoria, Chambers,
Galveston, Harris,
and Matagorda
Hurricane Evacuation**

- Layer List
- Operational layers
- 2016 USA Population Dens
 - Critical Facilities
 - Public Safety and Security
 - High-Density Occupancy
 - Transportation
 - Utilities
 - Industrial
 - All Critical Facilities
- Legend
- Critical Facilities**
- Public Safety and Security
 - FEMA Disaster Recovery Center
 - Local Emergency Operation Cent
 - Emergency Medical Services
 - Fire Station
 - Police Station
 - Hospital
 - Shelter
- Water Features**
- Streams
 - Water Bodies
- Location Damage Area
- Location
- Buffer
- <http://range02.h-gac.com/flood/>


- Legend
- Census Urban Area (2015)**
- Census Urban Area
- Current_Land_Use**
- Current Land Use
- Commercial
 - Industrial
 - Residential
 - Government/Medical/Educat
 - Multiple
 - Other
 - Parks/Open Spaces
 - Vacant Developable (include
 - Undevelopable
 - Unknown
- Layer List
- Operational layers
- Census Urban Area (201
 - Land Cover Change from Forest/Shrubs
 - Land Cover 1996
 - Land Cover 2015
 - Urban Forestry Metrics
 - Hexagonal 2-Acre Grids
 - Urban Forestry Analysis
 - Census Places
 - Current_Land_Use
 - Counties
- <http://range02.h-gac.com/urbanforestry/>



RELi RESILIENCE ACTION LIST



RESILIENCY PRIORITIZATION





PLANNING

- Client establishes priorities from TVRA
- Based on Priorities identified, who?
 1. Decision makers for the client
 2. Hands on operators during an emergency event
 3. First responders
- If 2 & 3 are external to the college, have security expertise to speak to downstream risks (i.e. metal detection = queue lines)



BUILD YOUR TEAM



Typical Team
Facilities & Operations
IT/AV/Security
Campus Fire & Life Safety



BUILD YOUR TEAM

Typical Team

Facilities & Operations
IT/AV/Security
Campus Fire & Life Safety

Proposed Team

Facilities & Operations
IT/AV/Security
Campus Fire & Life Safety
+
Campus Police
Fire Marshall
NIMS Command Structure
College Operations
Health Operations



TEAM ROLES

DECISION MAKERS

Listen and make choices and decisions.

COLLEGE AND HEALTH OPERATIONS

- Building communication
- managing the chaos
- mental trauma

NIMS COMMAND STRUCTURE

- Coordination of event
- medical evacuation
- media management
- reunification
- Volunteer management

CAMPUS POLICE / 1ST RESPONDERS

- Entry to the building
- Threat engagement
- Types of weapons
- Engagement training

FACILITIES & OPERATIONS – CAMPUS FIRE & LIFE SAFETY

- What do you train people to do in an emergency?
- Where are escape routes and collection points?
- How do occupants get notification?

GROUP INPUT | DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

- Corners and intersections
- Curved vs straight halls
- Walls for hardening
- Materials to use
- Escape routes with cover (hard bulletproof structure)
- Glass protect it?
- Multiple exits from rooms
- Covered Car drop off zones (concealment)
- Life safety warning systems (Fire Marshal is open)

RISK REDUCTION- CAMPUS CONSTRUCTION PLANS

SAMPLE

Proposed Security System concept for future facility construction.

Conceptual overview:

Security systems should be layered to provide the best possible protection for the facility and those who frequent it. Layering the systems permits very functional data collection and early warning systems without the high cost of single solution technologies.

Parking area:

The parking areas have natural "choke points" in their driveways. Each driveway should be fitted with adequate lighting at a level enabling the interior of the vehicle to light as the vehicle passes. The driveways should have CCTV cameras fixed with proper lenses to capture license plate numbers and images of the driver as a minimum. Entry and exit points should be monitored.

Parking areas with topography that would enable entry or exit via paths other than the driveways should be enhanced to prevent that from occurring. Dirt berms, culverts and cable fences etc. should be considered as deterrents to force entering and exiting via the monitored driveways.

Throughout the parking areas lighting is a critical component of a comprehensive crime prevention effort and should be considered a basic necessity to the overall parking lot security plan. Minimum lighting standards are well established and readily available to designers assigned these projects.

Building Perimeters

Building perimeters should be controlled and provide access to only those with granted access via a vetting process. The physical configuration is as follows:

The main or front entrance into a facility should be controlled after hours by a card access system and monitored by CCTV. During the day (working hours) these doors will be left open and provide entry into a staffed lobby. The lobby will have the ability to record the identity of visitors and be able to issue temporary or visitor badges for movement through the facility. When leaving the lobby area on a 24 X7 basis an individual will need to pass an access controlled portal into the remainder of the facility.

Entries not considered the main entry, but which are adjacent to parking, picnic areas and the like will also be controlled by access control systems and monitored by CCTV. This will permit the free entry and exit for authorized persons through these "convenience portals".

Emergency exits are portals in most facilities which are intended for exclusive egress in emergency situations only. These portals should be locked at all times from the exterior of the facility, they should be fitted with emergency egress hardware, a door position switch, and where appropriate a local door alarm.

Critical function areas i.e. mechanical, electrical, network and security closets should also be protected by access control and monitored by CCTV.

General CCTV views of the facility should be limited to the major corridors with minimal cameras installed. Only those required to provide general monitoring of the activity in any major corridor to monitor activity flow and support active shooter response by first responders.

space there maybe "special application" areas which should be by measures. Some examples are the pharmacy drug storage. These situations can be addressed during the building design packages can be identified and included based on need and

General security packages:

shall be electronic mortis as a standard. Electronically be specified if the application requires emergency egress the same location.

ports locking is not an acceptable standard and will only be used tion is available. It will not be acceptable if these types of ect the perimeter of any facility.

cameras. There megapixel rating, low light capability, etc. will be camera tasking has been made clear. Alternatives can be used less, solar applications.

stalled in any facility where glass can be accessed at the street ea. Glass detection will be dual technology devices to reduce on.

ounted in the door frame at the jam in a manner that they will be wise or connecting wires from either the secure or insecure side

h specific applications other than CCTV image recording tasking will drive the specification.

Personnel door:

control interface devise

ransactions at the access control point.

need to be scheduled for opening and closing of the

th:

(state)

plug type is preferred, door/guide rail is acceptable, floor eds. ers can be used if the doors are power opened.

h a blank hardware set on the unsecure side of the door. nstalled

OPERATIONS & INFRASTRUCTURE


- Security Personnel
- Operations Side of Equation

Security Operations Center

- Primary Hub
- Priorities
- Control Center
- Old & New Technology
- Communications



Design & Implement



Vedanta University Medical Precinct Master Plan




San Jose State University Student Center




INTEGRITY

Texas A&M University Memorial Student Center








Safe Cover in Classrooms



Safe Cover in Classrooms





Clemson University Watt Family Innovation Center



Clemson University Watt Family Innovation Center

WHAT ARE YOUR COUSTOMERS ASKING FOR?

- Metal detection
- Bulletproof glass
- Bulletproof walls
- Escape barricades
- No windows
- Vestibule protection
- Revolving doors
- Lock-down systems
- Bollards
- Partition doors
- Alarms
- Safe Rooms
- CCTV
- Gun shot detection
- Bomb Dogs
- Door blocker
- Door kickstands
- Operable windows
- Doors to exterior
- Life safety warning systems
- Panic Buttons
- Mass Notification



SECURITY PLANNING ROADMAP

1. Start Up Information
2. Research & Prioritize
3. Build a Collaborative Security Planning Team
4. Security Construction Plan
5. Review & Approval Process
6. Operations Plan
7. Evaluate

A grayscale photograph of a hand writing on a chalkboard. The hand is positioned on the right side of the frame, holding a piece of chalk. The chalkboard has some faint, illegible handwriting on it. Overlaid on the left and center of the image is the word "Answers!" in a large, bold, blue sans-serif font.

Answers!



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Resources

Security Planning Roadmap

1. Start Up Information

- a. Budget
- b. Program
- c. Special requirements

2. Research & Prioritize

Research, Threat Vulnerability Risk Assessment (TVRA), CAP Index, prioritize all risks including established security countermeasures with the Security Planning Team.

3. Build a Collaborative Security Planning Team

- a. Decision Makers
- b. Planning
- c. Emergency Operations team (NIMS Command people)
- d. First responders (Internal, external or both)

Security Planning Roadmap – Cont.

4. **Security Construction Plan.** Create a project or a campus and include security countermeasures as identified based on highest priorities governed by budget.
5. **Review & Approval Process.** Who will review and approve the design and at what stages will it be reviewed against the Security Construction Plan?
6. **Operations Plan.** Create an operations plan for new or renovated building.
7. **Evaluate.** Upon completion, evaluate, assess and update Security Construction Plan for future work on Campus.

RESOURCES

FEMA 428

Primer to Design Safe School Projects in case of Terrorist Attacks and School Shootings

- Security Risk
- Design Considerations
- # of Incidents
- Blast
- Toxic Release

CPTED – Crime Prevention through Environmental Design

Multi-disciplinary approach to deterring criminal behavior through design.

- Natural Surveillance
- Controlled Access
- Territorial Reinforcement
- Maintenance

USSS – Enhancing School Safety Using Threat Assessment Model

An Operational Guide for Preventing Targeted School Violence

- Threat Assessment
- Management Options
- Create & Promote Safe
- Training



RESOURCES

NFPA 72, 2010 Chapter 24: Mass Notification

Changes allowing
fire alarm systems to
be used as
emergency
notification systems

NFPA 3000 Standard for an Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response (ASHER) Program

Addresses all
aspects of the
process.

A hand holding a white coffee cup against a blue background. The hand is positioned on the left side of the frame, with the fingers wrapped around the cup. The background is a solid blue color with a subtle, wavy pattern.

U.S. Secret Service's Six Principals for Threat Assessment Protocols

END RESULT

Targeted violence is the end result of an understandable, and often times discernable process of thinking and behavior.

STEMS

Targeted violence stems from an interaction among the individual, the situation, the setting, and the target.

MINDSET

An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mindset is critical to the successful threat assessment.

FACTS

Effective threat assessment is based upon facts, rather than on characteristics or "traits."

APPROACH

An "integrated systems approach" should guide threat assessment inquiries and investigations.

THREAT

The central question in threat assessment inquiry or investigation is whether a student poses a threat, not whether the student has made a threat.